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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the eff ects of fi scal policy and institutions on the economic 
growth of Asian economies through the application of the GMM-SYS approach 
to dynamic panel estimator as a preference analysis. It examines two diff erent 
channels through which fi scal policy can aff ect long-run economic growth in 
Asia. The fi rst channel is when aggregate government expenditure, aggregate 
of other fi scal variables, and institution aff ect the real per capita GDP, and the 
second channel is to determine the role of institutions on the real per capita 
GDP. The dynamic panel data result, especially GMM-SYS, established a long-
run relationship between fi scal policy, institution, and economic growth. We 
found positive and statistically signifi cant impact of aggregate of government 
expenditure and aggregate of other fi scal variables and institution on real per 
capita GDP. Furthermore, we found that there is a role of institutions on the real 
per capita GDP. 
Keywords: Economic growth; institutions; aggregate of government 
expenditure; aggregate of other fi scal variables; dynamic panel cointegration.  
ABSTRAK
Artikel ini mengkaji kesan dasar fi skal dan institusi ke atas pertumbuhan 
ekonomi di negara-negara Asia melalui aplikasi pendekatan GMM-SYS daripada 
penganggar panel dinamik sebagai keutamaan analisis. Ujian dilakukan melalui 
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dua saluran yang berbeza yang mana dasar fi skal dapat memberi kesan jangka 
panjang ke atas pertumbuhan ekonomi. Saluran pertama ialah apabila aggregat 
perbelanjaan kerajaan, aggregat pemboleh ubah fi skal lain dan institusi dapat 
memberi kesan pada Keluaran Dalam Negara Kasar (KDNK) benar per 
kapita dan saluran kedua adalah untuk menentukan peranan institusi ke atas 
KDNK benar per kapita. Hasil kajian data panel dinamik terutama GMM-
SYS menunjukkan wujudnya hubungan jangka panjang  antara dasar fi skal, 
institusi dan pertumbuhan ekonomi. Didapati terdapat impak yang signifi kan 
dan positif aggregat perbelanjaan kerajaan dan aggregat pemboleh ubah fi skal 
lain dan institusi ke atas KDNK benar per kapita juga dapati adanya peranan 
institusi ke atas KDNK benar per kapita. 
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal policies have a benign role for economic growth in the region, 
namely to provide a stable macro environment for investment. The 
changed environment of liquidity constraints on external borrowing and 
slowdown in output growth have led to new att ention being directed 
toward the role and contribution of fi scal policy to reviving growth in 
the region (Gangopadhyay & Chatt erji, 2005). In the debate on economic 
policy, fi scal policy is predominantly viewed as an instrument to mitigate 
short-run fl uctuations of output and employment. By a variation in 
government spending or taxation, fi scal policy aims at altering aggregate 
demand in order to move the economy closer to potential output. Fiscal 
policy was neither a cause of the crisis nor a critical determinant of 
economic growth. Nevertheless, its role in both the pre-crisis and post-
crisis period in Asian countries has been seen as crucial, primarily in 
terms of its contribution to economic growth.
In Asian countries also, effi  ciency of the role of institutions is sadly 
lacking, and there are numerous defi ciencies in the functioning of 
role of institutions. Institutions mostly thrive on informal networks of 
political and family connections. There is a certain lack of transparency 
and accountability in the operation of government role of institutions in 
Asian countries. This type of institutional operation has not only resulted 
in high transaction costs but has also created political and economic 
uncertainty in the region.
The framework of institutions comprises the legal rules and norms 
that constrain the behaviour of policy-makers. Legal rules and norms 
should also guarantee that government actions do not undermine but 
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rather support the functioning of economic growth. Government actions 
should be limited and well constrained by appropriate institutions. 
Rules and norms can enhance the effi  ciency of fi scal policies and reduce 
the scope for rent seeking. Institutions can also secure the stability of 
fi scal policies by preventing erratic changes in defi cit, tax laws, and 
expenditure programmes. Generally, it was concluded that there is 
evidence which suggested that institutions are important determinants 
of economic growth. Government policies and institutions seem to play 
an important role, policies and institutions that minimise rent-seeking 
and att ract investment are correlated with higher growth. 
There are many non-economic factors which interact with the economic 
growth process, i.e. institutional economics in North and Thomas (1973) 
and North (1990) who examined the link between economic development 
and institutions, while there is a tradition in political science since 
Lipset (1959) explained political institutions and democracy in terms of 
economic development. 
Economic agents may interact in many diff erent ways. Certain agents 
may only be able to trade with certain others; some agents may try to 
make inferences from the activities of others. Agents may change their 
expectations as a function of the expectations of the others with who they 
are in contact with. A fi rst approach to analysing this sort of problem is 
to stay within the standard framework and to defi ne a suitable sort of 
static equilibrium, which takes account of interaction. The latt er may be 
local or global, that is, the fi rst case agents will be limited as to whom 
they have contact with, while the second agents may meet any other 
agent. 
There were three objectives of this study. The fi rst objective was to 
examine the long-run relationship among fi scal policy, institutions, 
and economic growth. The second objective was to examine the role of 
institutions on economic growth, and the fi nal objective was to examine 
whether institutions require complimentary factors to infl uence economic 
growth through interaction term eff ects. Thus, this study aimed at fi lling 
a gap in literature devoted solely to achieving the objectives using the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators developed for 
dynamic models of panel data, introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995), and Holtz-Eakin Newey, and Rosen (1998), 
and the GMM-system developed by Blundell and Bond (1998).
Our motivation of this study was to estimate an augmented Solow model 
of growth, adding fi scal policy and institution variables to the standard 
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economic variables of the Solow model. In addition to econometric 
reasons, the choice of the sample and the estimation procedure was 
guided by the need to produce results that are comparable with the 
fi ts and residuals computed on the basis of Hoeffl  er (2002). Therefore, 
the System Generalised Method of Moments (SYS-GMM) was adopted 
as the preferred estimation procedure. This was in-line with Hoeffl  er 
(2002), one of the benchmark papers used in the study. 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a brief literature 
review. In section 3, the model is applied to the 13 Asian economies. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results and the last section concludes. 
 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
The most recent empirical literature, mainly based on panel data 
regressions, showed that economic growth is signifi cantly aff ected by 
fi scal policies, although there remains some lack of agreement on the 
sign of the eff ects. Gerson (1998) surveyed the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the eff ect of fi scal policy variables (government expenditure 
programmes and taxes) on economic growth. He concluded that (1) 
educational att ainment and public health status have  signifi cant and 
positive eff ects on per capita output growth; (2) economies that are open 
to international trade grow faster than those that are closed, therefore 
fi scal policies that encourage openness should encourage growth; (3) 
government expenditure on physical infrastructure typically increases 
private sector productivity and output growth; (4) spending on 
defence and social services to maintain the social fabric might increase 
output growth if it contributes to political stability; and (5) saving and 
investment also appear to be relatively insensitive to changes in the rate 
of return, especially in developing countries.
Heller (1997) argued that capital infl ows should be accompanied by 
cautious fi scal policy. The infl ows would stimulate economic activity, 
as a result tax collection would increase and the fi scal balance, with 
unchanged expenditure, would improve. Nevertheless, fi scal contraction 
beyond this automatic adjustment is desirable in order to limit the 
expansionary pressures in the economy, to reduce the liquidity in the 
fi nancial market, and to limit the exchange rate appreciation that is 
caused by capital infl ows.
Dogan and Tang (2006) determined the direction of causality between 
national income and government expenditure for Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
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Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Their results of Granger causality 
test indicated that government expenditures do not play a signifi cant 
role in promoting economic growth in the four countries in their study, 
with the Philippines being the exception. Tang (2001) investigated the 
relationship between national income and government expenditure in 
Malaysia over the sample period 1960 to 1998. Results of the Johansen 
cointegration test indicated that there is no long-run relationship among 
real per capita national income and real per capita public expenditure. 
Therefore, Wagner thesis is not applicable in Malaysia. The Granger 
causality tests revealed a unidirectional causality, that is, from real per 
capita income growth to real per capita public expenditure growth. This 
indicates that Wagner’s law is a short-run phenomenon in Malaysia. The 
implication is that, as economic activities expand, more government 
expenditure is required. However, there is no evidence to support 
the Keynesian proposition that government expenditure as a policy 
instrument can be used to encourage growth in the Malaysian economy.
Zagler and Dürnecker (2003) surveyed the literature on fi scal policy and 
economic growth. They presented a unifying framework for the analysis 
of long-run growth implications of government expenditures and 
revenues. They found that the level of education expenditure and the 
growth rate of public infrastructure investment both exhibit a positive 
impact on the growth rate of the economy. Tanzi and Zee (1997) examined 
systematically the various ways that the main fi scal instruments (tax 
policy, public expenditure policy, and budget policy) infl uence economic 
growth through their impact on the determinants of growth. 
The question on how institutions fi t into a theory of economic growth of 
course depends not only on what one means by institutions, but also on 
the other aspects of that theory. Rodrik, Subramaniam, and Trebbi (2002) 
concluded that institutions rule over other potential determinants of 
growth and, in particular, these geographic variables have strong impact 
on institutions but litt le or no eff ect on growth beyond the institutional 
linkage. This means that quality of institutions overrides geography 
and integration (international trade) in explaining cross-country income 
levels. Rodrik (1997) found that an index of institutional quality-drawn 
from the work by Knack and Keefer (1995), and Easterly and Levine 
(1997) - does exceptionally well in rank-ordering East Asian countries 
according to their growth performance. 
North (1990) argued that it is the country’s institutions that determine 
the long-run economic performance, by defi ning the way the political/
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economic system operates. North identifi ed the government’s 
enforcement of property rights, its share of GNP, and the regulations it 
imposes as the most important determinants of economic performance. 
These institutions clearly could have a signifi cant eff ect on the TFP of a 
country’s economic system.
Leblang (1996) suggested that there is a positive correlation between 
economic and political freedom and economic growth. Goldsmith (1995) 
also concluded that both economic and political freedom is correlated 
with economic growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) found litt le 
evidence that political systems aff ect growth, but they did not examine 
economic institutions. Gwartney, Lawson, and Block (1996) developed a 
measure of economic freedom that is independent of political freedom, 
and their analysis indicated that there is a simple correlation between 
economic freedom and economic growth. Barro (1996) concludes that 
aft er adjusting for various economic factors, democracy has, if anything, 
a negative impact on economic growth. Building on this prior work, 
this paper seeks to identify more precisely the characteristics conducive 
to economic growth and the key institutional and policy factors that 
contribute to the diff erences in the growth rates across countries.
Rodrik et al. (2002) followed this analysis in treating current institutions 
as a stock that has been created by a past fl ow of good or bad policies, that 
is, by the operation of past institutions. Results thus rely upon current 
measures of the rule of law. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) found 
that once the eff ect of resource fl owing on institutions (with an emphasis 
on rule of law) is accounted for, resources have no eff ect or a small 
positive eff ect on growth rates of per capita GDP. Law and Demetriades 
(2006) examined whether institutions are an important determinant of 
fi nancial development by using dynamic panel data techniques. They 
found that the institution variable is signifi cant in determining fi nancial 
development in all models. 
Chen and Gupta (2006) examined the structural factors that may have 
an eff ect on economic growth. They worked with panel data where 
observations are pooled on a cross-section over a period of time. They 
began with a linear growth regression specifi cation and then extended 
it to account for interaction terms. The interaction terms were between 
a variable to measure for openness and the various structural factors 
such as education, fi nancial depth, public expenditure on education 
and health, and the infl ation rate. They concluded that the interaction 
terms between openness and government expenditure on health and 
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education, and between openness and fi nancial depth have positive 
coeffi  cients. This implies that in the economies where the government 
spends more on education and health and with a relatively developed 
fi nancial system, openness will have a positive eff ect on growth.
Law and Demetriades (2006) found that the coeffi  cient for the models 
containing the interaction term demonstrates that the interaction between 
capital infl ows and import duties is positive and has a highly signifi cant 
infl uence on fi nancial development. Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 
(1998) detected a positive and signifi cant interaction between the stock 
of human capital and FDI. Eller, Haiss, and Steiner (2006) implemented 
a second improvement interaction term between the stock of FSFDI and 
the stock of human and physical capital. They found that the interaction 
between the FSFDI stock with the index of employee education has a 
positive impact on economic growth, and the interaction between the 
FSFDI stock with the stock of physical capital is associated negatively 
with growth. They also considered the positive human capital-related 
interaction term in their model and they discovered complementary 
eff ects between FSFDI and human capital on economic growth. 
Furthermore, FSFDI seems to spur economic growth as human capital 
stock increases.
Benos (2005) allowed for heterogeneity in the coeffi  cients of government 
spending on education, health, and social services across countries. 
He found that the interaction term between social spending and GDP 
per capita is negative and statistically signifi cant in three out of six 
estimations, implying that the infl uence of social spending on growth 
might weaken the higher the development level of a country. The eff ect of 
health expenditure seems to be stronger the richer a country is, although 
the relevant variable interaction between health expenditure and GDP is 
not statistically signifi cant most of the time. 
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
Following Hoeffl  er (2002) in the Solow model, growth in output per 
worker depends on initial output per worker [y(0)], the initial level of 
technology [A(0)], the rate of technological progress (g), the savings rate 
(s), the growth rate of the labour force (n), the depreciation rate (δ), and 
the share of capital in output (α). Thus, the model predicts that a high 
saving rate will aff ect growth in output per worker positively, whereas 
high labour force growth (corrected by the rate of technological progress 
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and the rate of depreciation) will have a negative eff ect on growth in 
output per worker. The basic Solow model is                   
where )(ty denotes the logarithm of output per worker in period t.
In the augmented version of the Solow model, investment in human 
capital is an additional determinant of growth in output per worker
                      
where ks and hs denote the proportion of output invested in physical 
and human capital, respectively.
Equations (1) and (2), for example, have been used as the framework 
for empirical analysis by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), Islam (1995) 
and Caselli, Esquirel, and Lefort (1996). In this section, a simple model 
is set out that provides an organising framework for thinking about 
the ways in which the components of fi scal policy, institutions, and 
interaction term aff ect economic growth. Therefore, this study adopted 
the framework introduced by Mankiw et al. (1992), Demetriades and 
Law (2006), Ghura and Hadjimichael (1996), Hoeffl  er (2002), and 
Knight, Loayza, and Villanuera (1993). This study provided a growth 
model from the conventional growth accounting framework and the 
production function below takes the standard neoclassical form with a 
minor modifi cation as in Model 1 and Model 2 below:  
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where Yit is a real GDP per capita, GEit is an aggregate of government 
expenditure variables as a share of GDP (obtained by summing up the 
government expenditure on health, education, and  defence), OFVit  is 
an aggregate of other fi scal variables as a share of GDP (obtained by 
summing up public sector wages and salaries, expenditure on other 
goods and services, transfers and subsidies, interest payment on 
government debt, capital expenditure (minus government expenditure 
on health, education and defence), tax revenues, non-tax revenues, and 
grant), kitS  is the savings in physical capital, :)( δ++ gn n is the rate 
of labour growth, g is the rate of technology growth or technological 
progress and δ  is the rate of depreciation. The addition of g and δ  
is assumed to be constant across countries and over time, following 
Islam (1995), Mankiw et al. (1992), and Caselli et al. (1996), technological 
progress and the depreciation rate are assumed to be constant across 
countries and that they sum up to 0.05. The natural logarithm of the 
sum of population growth is 0.05 and was calculated  for 1n (n + g + 
δ). In addition,  INSit is an institution indicator which is obtained by 
summing up the fi ve indicators (corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule 
of law, government repudiation of contracts, and risk of expropriation), 
GEit * INSit and AFVit * INSit are interactions between the aggregate of 
government expenditure variables and institutions and the aggregate 
of other fi scal variables and institutions, i is a cross-section data for 
countries referred to, and t is a time series data, εit is an error term. The 
constant is denoted as 0β  while 1β to 6β   are the coeffi  cients showing 
how much a one unit increase in each individual variable will aff ect the 
growth rate in economic growth. 
Dynamic Panel Data Analysis Procedure
Following Hoeffl  er (2002), in a panel data model, we can explicitly 
account for permanent unobserved country specifi c eff ects, iη . This 
provides a panel data model of the form
                                     
where tiy , denotes the growth rate of real per capita GDP, 1, −tiy is the 
initial level of real per capita GDP, t denotes points in time t = 2, …T. 
For example tiy , may refl ect the average growth rate over a series of 
four-year periods, with 1, −tiy  being the level of real per capita GDP at 
the beginning of these periods, and Xit being measured either at the 
itiittiti xyy Qηγβα ++++= −1,,                                         (5) 
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beginning of each period, or as an average over each of the four-year 
periods.
Since the relevant four-year growth rate in Equation (5) is a logarithmic 
diff erence of GDP per capita, we have the following dynamic panel data 
model
                           
or equivalently 
                                         
where )1(* += ββ . It is important to note that the typical panel in the 
study of economic growth has a small number of time series periods, i.e. 
T is small. 
OLS Levels Estimation and Within Groups Estimation
In this section, the study adopted the autoregressive model from 
Bonds (2002), compromising the estimation of the following equation: 
                                                                     (8) 
where yit  is an observation on some series for individual i in period t, 
1, −tiy  is the observation on the same series for the same individual in the 
previous period, iη is an unobserved individual-specifi c time-invariant 
eff ect which allows for heterogeneity in the means of the yit series across 
individuals, and vit is a disturbance term. A key assumption that was 
maintained throughout is that the disturbances vit are independent 
across individuals. 
As Hsiao (1986) showed, omitt ing unobserved time invariant country 
eff ects in a dynamic panel model will cause OLS level estimate to be 
biased and inconsistent. The lagged dependent variable, 1, −tiy , is 
positively correlated with the permanent eff ects, iη . As a result, the OLS 
level estimate of coeffi  cient β* in the typical regression is likely to be 
biased upward (Hoeffl  er, 2002).
 itiittitiit xyyy Qηγβα ++++=− −− 1,1,                           (6) 
 itiittiit xyy Qηγβα ++++= −1,*                                         (7) 
( ) TtNivyy ititiit ,...,3,2;,...,2,1;1,1, ==<++= − αηα
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Alternatively, the within groups estimator diff erentiates all variables 
from their respective time means. It is assumed that all right-hand 
side variables are strictly exogenous, which is violated at least by the 
lagged variable. As such, it introduces a signifi cant correlation between 
non-exogenous variables and the time-demeaned error term (Bonds, 
2002), which decreases as the number of periods tends towards infi nity 
(Baltagi, 1995). The within groups estimator eliminates this source of 
inconsistency by transforming the equation to eliminate iη . Specifi cally 
the mean values of yit, yi,t-1, ηi and across T–1 observations for each 
individual i are obtained, and the original observations are expressed 
as deviations from these individual means. Within groups estimator is 
also inconsistent and standard results for omitt ed variables bias would 
indicate that, at least in large samples, the within groups estimate *βˆ  is 
likely to be biased downward (Bonds, 2002). Consequently, the estimate 
of *βˆ  obtained from OLS levels can be regarded as an approximate 
upper bound on this coeffi  cient, and the estimate obtained from within 
groups estimation can be regarded as an approximate lower bound 
(Hoeffl  er, 2002).
GMM Estimators for Dynamic Panel Data Model 
The GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), known as 
two-step estimation, is constructed in two phases. Firstly, fi rst diff erenced 
regressions and/or instruments from the dynamic panel data model 
are calculated to control for unobserved eff ects; then, secondly, using 
lagged observation values of the right-hand side explanatory variables 
in levels as their instruments. With lagged dependent variable and other 
endogenous regressors, the lagged levels are dated t-2 and earlier. If 
there are predetermined regressors, all their lagged levels are used as 
instruments. 
Consider the panel data model specifi cation
     
                                     itittitiit uxyyy ++−=− −− γβ 1,1, )1*(                             (9) 
itiitu Qη +=                             (10) 
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where tiy ,  is the logarithm of dependent variables, tix ,  is the set of 
other endogenous variable, uit is the time-specifi c eff ects, ηit is the 
country-specifi c eff ects, and vit is the error term; for i = 1, …, N, t = 2, 
…T. The single regressor xit is correlated with iη and predetermined 
with respect to εit meaning that E ( xit vit+s ) = 0, s = 0,..., T − t  but 
E ( xit vit+s ) ≠ 0, r = 1,..., t − 1. A commonly used estimator is the GMM 
estimator in the model in fi rst diff erence (Arellano & Bond, 1991),
                                     
Aft er accounting for the time-specifi c eff ects and grouping all explanatory 
variables in a vector x, Equations (9), (10), and (11) can be rewritt en as:
                                                                                         
The estimation of cross-country eff ects is based on a regression on time-
averaged data. In order to sweep out unobserved individual country 
specifi c eff ects iη  that are a source of inconsistency in the estimates and 
specifi ed and in order to obtain a consistent estimate of *β  as ∞→N  
for fi xed T we take fi rst diff erence of Equation (7). 
                                               
Since the diff erenced lagged dependent variable and the diff erenced error 
term are correlated OLS estimation of Equation (13) will not produce a 
consistent estimate of *β , even if the regressor, tix ,  is strictly exogenous. 
The GMM estimator suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) is known 
to be rather  ineffi  cient  when  instruments  are  weak  because  it makes 
use  of  the  information contained in diff erences only. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) suggested making use of additional level information besides the 
diff erences. The combination of moment restrictions  for  diff erences 
and  levels  results  in  an  estimator called  the GMM-system estimator 
by Arrellano and Bond.  
Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Hoeffl  er (2002), we can use values 
of the predetermined xit lagged one period or more as valid instruments 
Ttuxyy itittiit ,...,2;* 1, =Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ − γβ                                        (11) 
ititittiit xyy Qηγβ Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ −1,*                                                    (12) 
)()()(* 11211 −−−−− −+−+−=− tiittiittititiit xxyyyy QQγβ                
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in the fi rst diff erenced growth equation. It is also straightforward to 
treat, for example, investment as an endogenous variable. This means 
that we are allowing for correlation between current investment and 
current shocks to GDP, as well as feedback from past shocks to GDP, i.e.
        
In this case, the valid instruments in the diff erenced equation are values 
of the endogenous xit lagged two periods or more.
Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that estimators relying on lagged 
levels as instruments for current diff erences are likely to perform poorly 
when the series are close to a random walk. In this case, the available 
instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, 
and the GMM estimator is likely to suff er from serious fi nite sample 
bias, as well as imprecision (Hoeffl  er, 2002). Instead, they suggested 
estimating a system by combining two sets of equations. One set of 
equations is the diff erenced equation (13)
              
         
We used lagged levels of yit and xit as instruments, as discussed for the 
fi rst diff erenced GMM estimation. The other set of equations in the 
system is the levels equation, which is Equation (12)
       
provided the xit regressor satisfi es 
                                                        
and the initial conditions satisfy the restriction 
               
Arellano and Bover (1995) proposed the estimators of 1, −Δ tiy and ∆xit as 
instruments in the level equation. It is assumed that equation (16) allows
the level of itx  to be correlated with the unobserved country specifi c 
eff ects, iη , but requires the changes in itx to be uncorrelated with iη . 
0)( ≠isitxE Q for ts d                                                                                                    (14) 
and  
0)( =isitxE Q for ts ! only                                                                                       (15) 
 itiittiit xyy Qηγβα ++++= −1,*      
 0)( =Δ iitxE η                                                       (16) 
0)( 2 =Δ iiyE η                             (17) 
)()()(* 1,1,2,1,1,  ++= tiittiittititiit xxyyyy   
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The consistency of the GMM estimators depends on whether lagged 
values of the explanatory variables are valid instruments in the growth 
regression. This issue was addressed by considering two specifi cation 
tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover 
(1995). The fi rst is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
tests the overall validity of the instruments. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis gives support to the model. The second test examines the 
null hypothesis that the error term is not serially correlated. As with 
the Sargan test, the model specifi cation is supported when the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. In the system specifi cation, we test whether 
the diff erenced error term (that is, the residual of the regression in 
diff erences) is second-order serially correlated. Second-order serial 
correlation of the diff erenced residual would indicate that the original 
error term is serially correlated and follows a moving average process 
at least of order one. This would reject the appropriateness of the 
proposed instruments (and would call for higher-order lags to be used 
as instruments).
The test statistics of AR(1) and AR(2) test for the presence of serial 
correlation in the fi rst diff erenced residuals of fi rst and second order, 
respectively. They are asymptotically normally N(0,1) distributed 
under the null of no serial correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). First 
order autocorrelation AR(1) is expected to be negatively signifi cant 
but according to the second order autocorrelation AR(2) test, it is not 
signifi cant, which is the crucial point with respect to the validity of the 
instruments.
DATA AND CHOICE OF VARIABLES
The data set consisted of a panel of observations for 13 Asian countries1 
for the period 1982-2001. The dependent variable is chosen as real 
GDP growth per capita in all sets of regressions. To account for the lag 
between the initial level of per capita GDP, average savings and average 
population growth rate (adjusted for the depreciation rate and the rate of 
technological progress), aggregate of government expenditure variables, 
aggregate of other fi scal variables, and institutions and the eff ect on 
output growth, we used a four-year forward moving average to eliminate 
business cycle type short-run fl uctuations induced by the shift s in these 
explanatory variables, and this also increases the number of time series 
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observations in our panel data. As pointed out by Devarajan, Swaroop, 
and Zou (1996), the fi ve-year forward lag structure addresses the joint 
endogeneity of variables and the possibility of reverse causality. In that 
sense, the joint endogeneity of our explanatory variables and economic 
growth is an issue that should be taken more seriously in our framework. 
Annual data were collected from the World Development Indicator, 
Asian Development Bank, and The Government Finance Statistics. 
Following Demetriades and Law (2006), the data set on institutional 
quality indicators are obtained from the International Country Risk 
Guide. The fi rst three variables are scaled from 0 to 6, whereas the last two 
variables are scaled from 0 to 10. Higher values indicate bett er ratings for 
institutional quality and vice versa. The scale of corruption, bureaucratic 
quality and rule of law was fi rst converted to 0 to 10 (multiplying them 
by 5/3) to make them comparable to the other indicators. The institution 
indicator is obtained by summing up the above fi ve indicators.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, results are presented for the dynamic panel data 
estimators of Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
Results will be outlined for GMM estimation in diff erence (DIF) 
and system (SYS) versions and also the OLS level and within groups 
estimation techniques. Table 1 and Table 2 report our results for Model 1 
and Model 2 which are a version of the augmented Solow model, where 
the logarithm of the aggregate of government expenditure, aggregate 
of other fi scal variables, institutions, and the interaction terms between 
the aggregate of government expenditure and institutions and between 
the aggregate of other fi scal variables and institutions are included as 
additional explanatory variables. 
OLS and Within Groups Results
Models in Table 1 and Table 2 follow the suggestion of Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998; 1999), where all regressions 
include time dummies which we found to be jointly signifi cant in every 
regression. The tables show the parameter estimates (in parenthesis), 
the standard errors of the parameter estimates (robust to arbitrary forms 
of cross-sectional and time-series heteroskedasticity) and a selection of 
diagnostic statistics. 
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In Table 1 and Table 2, the left -hand side variable is the change in the 
logarithm of explanatory variables. We begin our analysis with an OLS 
regression in column 2 through Table 1 and Table 2, the estimates of 
the coeffi  cients for the initial per capita GDP (1n rgdpit-1) are negative, 
-2.042 (Model 1) and -2.039 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at 1% 
level for both models. The negative coeffi  cient on initial GDP as in most 
published growth regressions is interpreted as conditional convergence 
as suggested by the Solow model (Hoeffl  er, 2002). 
In Table 1 and Table 2, the estimated coeffi  cients for the aggregate of 
other fi scal variables  )(lnOFV  are positive, 0.202 (Model 1) and 0.170 
(Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 5% level in both models. The 
estimates of the coeffi  cients for the aggregate of government expenditure 
(1n GE)  are positive, 2.093 (Model 1) and 2.324 (Model 2), and statistically 
signifi cant at the 1% level in Model 1 and signifi cant at the 5% level in 
Model 2. Thus, the aggregate of government expenditure and aggregate 
of other fi scal variables have a positive and signifi cant eff ect on real per 
capita GDP growth. 
We found that the estimates of the coeffi  cients for the institutions )(ln ins  
are positive, 2.269 (Model 1) and 1.107 (Model 2), and statistically 
signifi cant at the 5% level in both models. Thus, institutions have a positive 
and signifi cant eff ect on real per capita GDP growth. The interaction 
terms try to identify whether institutions require complimentary 
factors to infl uence economic growth. We found that the interaction 
terms included, between institutions and the aggregate of government 
expenditure (1n GE *ins) and between institutions and the aggregate of 
other fi scal variables )*(ln insOFV  have positive coeffi  cients [1.414 
(Model 1) and 0.435 (Model 2)] and statistically signifi cant at the 1 and 
5% levels in Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. Again we found that 
the inclusion of interaction term between the aggregate of government 
expenditure and institutions, and between the aggregate of other fi scal 
variables and institutions as added regressors in the growth equations 
(Model 1 and Model 2) does not generally aff ect the sign or absolute 
magnitude of the estimates; they are not less precisely estimated than 
their counterparts in Model 1 or Model 2. These results imply that 
economies where the government gives more att ention to the aggregate 
of government expenditure and the aggregate of other fi scal variables, 
institutions will have a positive eff ect on economic growth. w
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By assuming that the savings in physical capital (investment) )(ln ks
is potentially endogenous variable and current population growth rate 
is potentially exogenous variable, these estimates already allow for 
the possibility of serially uncorrelated measurement error in either of 
these explanatory variables. In Table 1 and Table 2, we found that the 
estimated coeffi  cients for the savings in physical capital (investment) 
)(ln ks  are positive for both models, 0.988 (Model 1) and 0.855 (Model 
2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level for both models. Therefore, 
this indicates that savings in physical capital (investment) )(ln ks  has a 
signifi cantly positive eff ect on the steady state level of per capita GDP 
growth. Column 2 in Table 1 and Table 2 also shows that the coeffi  cients 
of population growth (1n (n + g + δ)) are negative, -0.937 (Model 1) and 
-0.994 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level in both 
models. This is in-line with the neoclassical growth model that predicts 
that as population increases, the steady state level of per capita GDP 
will decline through the lowering of the capital labour ratio. Thus, 
our fi ndings here is also in line with Solow model, where the negative 
coeffi  cient on initial GDP as in most published growth regressions is 
interpreted as conditional convergence, while investment is positive and 
population growth is negative.
Overall, based on the results presented in Table 1 and Table 2, and the 
arguments presented above, in accordance with expectations in the 
presence of fi rm-specifi c fi xed eff ects, OLS panel estimates seem to 
deliver an upward-biased estimate of the lagged dependent variable 
coeffi  cient. 
The results of the analysis with a within groups estimator are shown 
in the third and seventh column of Table 1 and Table 2. We found that 
the estimated coeffi  cients for the initial per capita GDP (1n rgdpit − 1) 
are negative, -2.485 (Model  1) and -2.391 (Model  2), and statistically 
signifi cant at 1% level for both models. Same as in the OLS estimates, 
the negative coeffi  cient on the initial GDP as in most published growth 
regressions is interpreted as conditional convergence as suggested by 
the Solow model. Therefore, comparing the estimated coeffi  cient of the 
OLS level regression and the within groups estimation, it was found that 
the OLS level provides a higher estimate for the coeffi  cients of the initial 
real per capita GDP than the within groups estimation for all models in 
all tables. 
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In Table 1 and Table 2, the estimated coeffi  cients for the aggregate of 
other fi scal variables )(lnOFV are positive, 0.642 (Model 1) and 0.167 
(Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 5% level in both models. 
For the aggregate of government expenditure , (1n GE) the estimated 
coeffi  cients are positive, 2.568 (Model 1) and 1.877 (Model 2), and 
statistically signifi cant at the 5%  level in both models. Thus, the aggregate 
of government expenditure and the aggregate of other fi scal variables 
have positive and signifi cant eff ects on real per capita GDP. 
Column 3 in Table 1 and Table 2 for the within groups estimation shows 
that the coeffi  cients for institutions are positive )(ln ins , 2.512 (Model 1) 
and 1.075 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 5% level which are 
the same as the results from the OLS estimation. The estimated coeffi  cients 
for the savings in physical capital (investment) )(ln ks are positive, 0.997 
(Model 1) and 0.936 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the one 
percent level in both models. The coeffi  cients for the population growth 
(1n (n + g + δ)) are negative, -1.024 (Model 1) and 0.936 (Model 2), and 
statistically signifi cant at the 1%  level in both models. Thus, institutions 
and savings in physical capital have a positive and signifi cant eff ect on 
real per capita GDP growth, and population growth is negative and has 
a signifi cant eff ect on real per capita GDP growth. 
Table 1: Estimation of Model 1; Dependent variable ∆ 1n rgdpcit 
OLS Within Groups DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
1n rgdpc(t−1) -2.042*(0.328) -2.485*(0.243) -2.176*(0.893) -0.858*(0.017)
1n GE 2.093*(1.976) 2.568**(1.521) 1.703*(0.336) 0.937*(0.362)
1n OFV 0.202**(0.188) 0.642**(0.271) 0.523**(0.191) 0.207*(0.089)
1n ins 2.269**(0.741) 2.512**(0.493) 2.476*(0.528) 1.686*(0.723)
1n sk 0.988*(0.264) 0.997*(0.233) 0.510*(0.349) 0.439*(0.186)
1n (n + g + δ) -0.937*(0.281) -1.024*(0.269) -0.043*(0.991) -0.690*(0.318)
1n (GE * ins) 1.414*(0.294) 1.071*(0.240) 0.427*(0.128) 1.403*(0.409)
No. of  obs. 52 52 52 52
Wald test: 5944.*(0.000) 5981.*(0.000) 3314.*(0.000) 762.9*(0.000)
Sargan test: - - 36.9(0.509) 154.3(0.164)
AR(1) test: -1.893**(0.058) -2.305**(0.021) -2.720*(0.007) -2.095*(0.006)
AR(2) test: -1.059(0.290) 1.344(0.179) 0.01103(0.991) 0.8046(0.421)
Notes:  Heteroskedasticity consistent standard error is reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** 
denote signifi cance at  1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies and constant are 
included. The fi gures reported for the tests of fi rst and second order correlation under the 
System-GMM column (AR (1) and AR (2)) as well as for the Wald test and Sargan test are the 
p-values of the null hypothesis.
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First Diff erenced GMM and System GMM Results
Hoeffl  er (2002) argued that for special cases of spherical disturbances, the 
one-step and two-step GMM estimators are asymptotically equivalent 
for the fi rst-diff erenced estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this case 
the two-step estimator is more effi  cient. Therefore, Column 4 presents 
the results using the Arellano and Bond (1991) fi rst diff erenced GMM 
estimator in Table 1 and Table 2 for all models. It was assumed that the 
initial GDP is predetermined and investment is endogenous. We also 
assume that current population growth is exogenous, in the sense of 
being uncorrelated with shocks to GDP per capita. This allows the use of 
both the current and lagged levels of population growth as instruments 
in the fi rst diff erenced equation. The OLS level will give an estimate of 
β that is biased upwards in the presence of individual-specifi c eff ects 
(Hsiao, 1986) and the within groups will give an estimate of *β  that 
is seriously biased downwards in short panels (Nickell, 1981). Thus, a 
consistent estimate of *β  can be expected to lie between the OLS levels 
and the within groups estimates. If we observe that the fi rst diff erenced 
GMM estimate is close to or below the within groups estimate, it 
seems likely that the GMM estimate is also biased downwards in our 
application, perhaps due to weak instruments.
In Column 4 from Table 1 and Table 2, it was found that all coeffi  cients 
are positive and statistically signifi cant at the 1 and 5% levels, except 
the coeffi  cient of population growth (1n (n + g + δ)), which is negative 
and statistically signifi cant at the one percent level. From these tables, it 
was found that the fi rst diff erenced GMM estimates of the coeffi  cients on 
the initial real per capita GDP in both tables are negative, -2.176 (Model 
one) and -2.104 (Model two), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level 
in both models. These results are close to the within groups estimates. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the case for the fi rst diff erenced 
GMM estimate seems to be downward biased, because it is very close 
to the within group estimate, which is expected to be seriously biased 
downwards in short panels with six or fewer time periods (Nickell, 1981). 
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Table 2: Estimation of Model 2; Dependent variable ∆ 1n rgdpcit 
OLS Within Groups DIF-GMM SYS-GMM
1n rgdpc(t−1) -2.039*(0.348) -2.391*(0.391) -2.104*(0.434) -0.862*(0.019)
1n GE 2.324**(1.547) 1.877**(1.700) 0.689*(0.154) 1.245*(1.076)
1n FP 0.170**(0.088) 0.167**(0.078) 0.109**(0.060) 0.204*(0.068)
1n ins 1.107**(0.486) 1.075**(0.481) 0.156*(0.909) 1.088*(0.353)
1n sk 0.855*(0.312) 0.936*(0.308) 0.599**(0.240) 0.537*(0.188)
1n (n + g + δ) -0.994*(0.269) -1.104*(0.326) -0.708*(0.259) -0.811*(0.414)
1n (OFV * ins) 0.435**(0.254) 0.398**(0.239) 0.084*(0.023) 0.051*(0.018)
No. of  obs. 52 52 52 52
Wald test: 7780. *(0.000) 579.0*(0.000) 3023.*(0.000) 1481.*(0.000)
Sargan test: - - 26.0(0.658) 131.1(0.384)
AR(1) test: -2.085**(0.037) -2.343**(0.019) -2.803*(0.005) -1.467*(0.003)
AR(2) test: -1.592(0.111) 0.2773(0.782) -1.296 (0.195) -0.9953(0.320)
Notes: Heteroskedasticity consistent standard error is reported in parentheses; *, **, and *** 
denote signifi cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Time dummies and constant 
are included. The fi gures reported for the tests of fi rst and second order correlation under the 
System-GMM column (AR (1) and AR (2)) as well as for the Wald test and Sargen test are the 
p-values of the null hypothesis.
The estimated coeffi  cients for the aggregate of other fi scal variables 
)(ln OFV are positive, 0.523 (Model 1) and 0.109 (Model 2), and 
statistically  signifi cant  at  the 5% level. The aggregate of government 
expenditure 1n GE is positive, 1.703 (Model 5) and 0.689 (Model 6), and 
statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. Table 1 and Table 2 also show 
that the coeffi  cients for institutions )(ln ins  are positive and statistically 
signifi cant at the 1% level in Model 1 and Model 2. The interaction terms 
between institutions and the aggregate of government expenditure 
1n GE * ins , and between institutions and the aggregate of other fi scal 
variables )*(ln insOFV have positive coeffi  cients, 0.427 (Model 1) and 
0.084 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. Thus, while 
the inclusion of interaction term between aggregate of government 
expenditure and institutions, and aggregate of other fi scal variables and 
institutions as an added regressor in the growth equations (Model 1 and 
Model 2) does not generally aff ect the sign or absolute magnitude of the 
estimates, they are not less precisely estimated than their counterparts 
in Model 1 or Model 2. It was concluded that the aggregate of other 
fi scal variables and the aggregate of government expenditure have a 
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positive and signifi cant eff ect on real per capita GDP growth. It was also 
found that the aggregate of other fi scal variables and the aggregate of 
government expenditure variables interact with institutions variable and 
could have a potential impact on long-run steady-state levels of growth. 
In Table 1 and Table 2, the estimated coeffi  cients for the savings in 
physical capital (investment) )(ln ks  are positive, 0.510 (Model 1) and 
0.599 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1 and 5% levels in 
Model 1 and Model 2, respectively. The coeffi  cients of population growth 
(1n ((n + g + δ)) are negative, -0.043 (Model 1) and -0.708 (Model 2), and 
statistically signifi cant at the 1%  level for both models. Again it was 
found that the results for the savings in physical capital (investment) and 
population growth in fi rst diff erenced GMM are in-line with the Solow 
model. Specifi cally, the negative coeffi  cient on initial GDP as in most 
published growth regressions is interpreted as conditional convergence, 
while investment is positive and population growth is negative. 
As mentioned previously, diff erenced GMM results potentially suff er 
from a bias in the direction of within groups results, due to weak 
instruments, related with persistent time series. In such case, GMM-SYS 
results would be preferable. The presented results do not seem to point 
toward a major problem, since the GMM-DIF estimations are situated 
quite central amongst the two extremes of OLS and within groups. This 
leads to the conclusion that the system GMM results shown in Table 1 
and Table 2 are to be the preferred parameter estimates.
The system GMM estimator thus combines the standard set of 
explanatory variables in fi rst diff erences with suitably lagged levels as 
instruments, with an additional set of explanatory variables in levels 
with suitably lagged fi rst diff erences as the instrument. As an empirical 
matt er, the validity of these additional instruments can be tested using 
standard Sargan tests of over-identifying restriction (Arellano & Bond, 
1991). For system GMM, the two-step estimator is always more effi  cient 
than the one-step estimator. However, Monte Carlo studies show that the 
effi  ciency gain is small and that the two-step estimator converges only 
slowly to its asymptotic distribution. In fi nite samples, the asymptotic 
standard errors associated with the two-step GMM estimator can be 
seriously biased downward (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Therefore, we 
followed Hoeffl  er (2002) who preferred to report the one-step estimates. 
The fi ft h column of Table 1 and Table 2 reports the results from system 
GMM, again treating investment as endogenous and population growth 
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as exogenous in the sense described before. The estimated coeffi  cient 
of the initial real per capita GDP is not obviously biased which lies 
well above the within groups estimate and well below the OLS levels 
estimate, and the estimates of the coeffi  cients are more precise than the 
ones obtained from the fi rst diff erenced GMM. This study agreed with 
Hoeffl  er (2002) that the additional instruments using the system GMM 
estimator appear to be both valid and highly informative in this context. 
In Column 5, the estimated coeffi  cients for the aggregate of other fi scal 
variables (1n FP) are positive, 0.207 (Model 1) and 0.204 (Model 2), and 
statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. The aggregate of government 
expenditure (1n GE) is positive, 0.937 (Model 1) and 1.245 (Model 2), 
and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. Table 1 and Table 2 also show 
that the coeffi  cients of institutions )(ln ins are positive, 2.476 (Model 1) 
and 0.156 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. The 
interaction terms between institutions, and the aggregate of government 
expenditure  (1n GE * ins) and institutions, and the aggregate of other 
fi scal variables )*(ln insOFV have positive coeffi  cients, 1.403 (Model 1) 
and 0.051 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level. Again, 
it was found that the aggregate of other fi scal variables and aggregate 
of government expenditure have a positive and signifi cant eff ect on real 
per capita GDP growth in system GMM. In this system GMM, it was 
also found that the aggregate of other fi scal variables and the aggregate 
of government expenditure variables interact with the institution 
variable, and could have a potential impact on the long-run steady-
state levels of growth. It was concluded that when the inclusion of the 
interaction terms between the aggregate of government expenditure and 
institutions and the aggregate of other fi scal variables and institutions as 
added regressors in the growth equations (Model 1 and Model 2) does 
not generally aff ect the sign or absolute magnitude of the estimates. 
In Table 1 and Table 2, as expected, the estimates of the coeffi  cients 
for the savings in physical capital (investment) )(ln ks  are positive, 
0.439 (Model 1) and 0.537 (Model 2), and statistically signifi cant at 
the 1% level in both models. The coeffi  cients on population growth 
(1n ((n + g + δ)) are negative, -0.690 (Model 1) and -0.811 (Model 2), 
and statistically signifi cant at the 1% level for both models. Our results 
matched many studies which control capital accumulation by including 
the rate of investment or savings. Levine and Renelt (1992) argued that 
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the positive correlation between growth and the share of investment in 
GDP is one of the few robust fi ndings from the cross-country growth 
regression literature. On the other hand, there are many growth studies 
that accounted for population growth. The eff ect of population growth 
on the growth in GDP per capita tended to be negative in some studies, 
but this fi nding is rather fragile (Levine & Renelt, 1992). Therefore, it was 
concluded that system GMM savings in physical capital have a positive 
and signifi cant eff ect on real per capita GDP growth, and population 
growth is negative and has signifi cant eff ect on real per capita GDP 
growth. 
The Wald tests of the joint signifi cance of the variables as well as the 
tests for autocorrelation and the Sargan test confi rmed that the GMM 
estimator estimated for Model 1 and Model 2 in Table 1 and Table 2 
are appropriate. First-diff erencing introduces AR(1) serial correlation 
when the time-varying component of the error term in levels is serially 
uncorrelated (Arellano & Bond, 1991). Therefore, GMM estimator 
is consistent only when second-order correlation is not signifi cant, 
although fi rst-order correlation need not be zero. Again, the fi rst and 
second order serial correlations tests are all satisfi ed. 
CONCLUSION
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the study. Firstly, 
this study att empted to identify the important role of institutions - 
government anti-diversion policies a weighted average of (i) corruption 
in government, (ii) rule of law, (iii) bureaucratic quality, (iv) repudiation 
of government contract, and (v) expropriation risk - in determining 
economic growth in a sample of 13 Asian countries. While the inclusion 
of institutions as an added regressor in the growth equations does not 
generally aff ect the sign or absolute magnitude of the estimates, they 
are not less precisely estimated than their counterparts. This is not 
surprising given that institutions are positively correlated with some 
of the regressors. The results from the analysis were signifi cant, and 
provided support for the historical evidence presented by North and 
Thomas (1973), Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986), and North (1990). They 
showed that the security of property rights provides incentives for 
economic growth in the world. Secure role of institutions also lead to an 
effi  cient allocation of fi scal policy.
Secondly, this study provided another framework of a set of linkages 
to capture most of the important interactions among economic growth, 
institutions, and fi scal policy. Economic indicators interact especially 
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with non-economic indicators. The positive results of the eff ect of the 
interaction terms between the aggregate of government expenditure and 
institutions and the aggregate of other fi scal variables and institutions 
on economic growth in 13 Asian economies are really interesting. These 
interaction terms as added regressors in the growth equations do not 
generally aff ect the sign or absolute magnitude of the estimates, they 
are not less precisely estimated than their counterparts. These results 
support earlier fi ndings from other researchers who stated that typically 
economic agents in models of interaction are thought of as being 
placed on a latt ice and interacting with their neighbours (Durlauf, 1990; 
Benabou, 1996; Blume, 1993;  Ellison, 1993; Brock & Durlauf, 2001.
We learned about the appropriate interaction between those two policies 
which are fi scal policy and institutions in the context of economic growth 
under an Augmented Solow model. Economists have also become more 
convinced that fi scal policies have signifi cant eff ect on the economy. Fiscal 
policy aff ects the success of economic growth in various ways: through 
its impact on general confi dence in institutions, and through modifying 
the long-term conditions for economic growth and institutions. Another 
important aspect of the interaction between fi scal policy and institutions 
is the need for a high degree of coordination in response to economic 
growth. 
The strength and direction of interaction are determined by a second 
variable, institutions. The strongest evidence was for causal links that 
go from changes in fi scal policy and institutions, which then further 
aff ects economic growth. Thus, for institutions to play an eff ective role in 
economic growth, fi scal policy must be in place that directs management 
of economic activities, such as government expenditure and other fi scal 
variables. The interaction terms in Model 1 and Model 2 were positive, 
suggesting that institution and government expenditures, and other fi scal 
variables support each other in promoting economic growth of Asian 
countries. The estimation results suggested that effi  cient institutions 
play a particularly signifi cant role in avoiding fi scal loosening, and to 
raise economic effi  ciency and growth, and thus to improve the overall 
fi scal position. The interaction between institutions and fi scal policy to 
enhance economic scrutiny with institutional reform to strengthen fi scal 
frameworks, can be a mutually reinforcing means of improving fi scal 
policies and economic growth.
Thirdly, we assessed the empirical evidence on the link between fi scal 
policy and growth by considering two aggregate variables, which are 
the aggregate of government expenditure (the sum of government 
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expenditure on health, education, and defence) and the aggregate of 
other fi scal variables in fi ve policy areas: public sector wages and salaries, 
expenditure on other goods and services, transfers and subsidies, interest 
payments on government debt, capital expenditure (minus government 
expenditure on health, education, and defence), tax revenues, non-tax 
revenues, and grants. The analyses of these fi scal policies in 13 Asian 
economies showed that the authorities do make active use of fi scal 
policy. This implies that fi scal policy is practically possible and can be 
eff ective in infl uencing the real per capita GDP. There is thus a rationale 
for fi scal policy. 
END NOTES
1.  The countries chosen for our study were as follows: China, 
Hong Kong, Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
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